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What constitutes a stable democracy has consistently changed over time, with
varying thresholds of democratic achievement being utilized. The definitions of a liberal
democracy have remained rather broad. This allows for states to be deemed democratic
rather easily through weak characteristics. However, while some states clearly begin to
exhibit illiberal democratic policies, therefore missing the democratic threshold, they are
able to maintain stability.
What the precise causal factors to democratic backslide are, have yet to be fully
realized. Academics pose a multitude of characteristics contributing to backslide. This
thesis seeks to examine two of those factors: ethnic heterogeneity and state “newness.”
New approaches to measuring democracy and fostering democratic development are
needed, however, they may also prove to be unsuccessful in analyzing democratic
transitions. Not all states are alike, therefore what works for one state may not work for
another, be the policies of the state liberal or illiberal.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Since approximately 1980, many authoritarian states have transitioned from
authoritarianism to some form of democracy. At the time of Huntington’s (1991) seminal
work regarding, what he termed as “the third wave” of democratization, there were an
estimated 30 countries undergoing some form of transition to a more liberal state. Since
that time we have been witness to an amalgam of varying transitions – both away from
and closer to democracy – by some accounts we have seen upwards of 100 countries
across the globe labeled as “transitional countries” (Carothers 2002). Under greater
scrutiny, however, these so-called new democratic states may have never entered a state
of democratic being, but rather fluctuate in a gray zone, as noted by Thomas Carothers
(2002). Not all states are created equally, which in fact emerges as a beneficial quality to
some states.

What external actors – NGOs, academics, foreign states – view as a

hindrance to democracy could promote a stable state. When examining nation-building
and practices to enable a successful democratic transition, an increasingly large literature
suggests that there is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model (Carothers 2002, Ottaway 2002). The
departure by academics in recent decades to ascribe a single factor to a state’s inability to
consolidate has led researchers to approach causation theories insularly. The success or
failure of democratic transition is founded on not one element, but a variety of factors.
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This thesis will examine democratic regressions with a specific focus on
developing an overarching model that recognizes there exists an amalgam of factors
impacting transition. The key contention is that variations in whether a state successfully
transitions to democracy, and also whether leaders have incentives to maintain a semiauthoritarian regime, are at least partly dependent upon whether one group makes
asymmetric policy claims on the state. Further, despite the inherently illiberal nature of
such concessions, stability often materializes in these states (Shoup 2011, 2014).
Related to this argument, various academics suggest ethnic heterogeneity
complicates the procedure of democratization (Hannan and Carroll 1981; Rueschmeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Horowitz 1993; Easterly 2001; Blimes 2006; Casey and
Owen 2014). At the crux, they indicate irreconcilable cultures and fear of loss of state
control compels ethnic groups to seek power by any means and then to create an avenue
which perpetually maintains their acquired position.

The apprehension of political

displacement by autochthonous groups raises the political stakes by generating
mobilization and consolidation of ethnic promote indigenous control of state institutions
and symbols.

The exclusive nature of politics promoted by autochthonous groups in

ethnically heterogeneous states only serves to increase the probability of democratic
deterioration. State institutions created to serve only the majority group threaten to
dissolve the little stability most newly formed states possess. Despite this erosion of
democracy, states manage to fortify a position of quasi-stability, in states where
ethnically-based redistribution practices allowed the institutionalization of ethnic
dominance, democratic inequalities play a pivotal role in providing stability, regardless of
the clear breaks from democratic practices (Shoup 2011, 2014). Absent ethnically-based
2	
  

	
  
redistribution practices, developing states undergoing power struggles between bipolar
ethnic factions are at a greater disadvantage, increasing the likelihood of instability and
further regression from democratic processes.
However, ethnic heterogeneity, distinctively more decreased heterogeneity such
as bipolarity, does not automatically predispose a state to experience problems with
democratic consolidation.

Canada, despite its ethnic cleavages between English

Canadians and French Canadians, has maintained a continuous liberal democratic
system.1

Canada has withstood secessionist and sovereignist calls by Francophone

Quebeckers through a balanced political climate which is over-inclusive of minorities,
emphasizing the protection of minority rights and liberal social programs which appease
the greater electorate (Kornberg 1990, Young 2007). The Canadian example has shown
ethnic heterogeneity is easily overcome if a system provides avenues which promote
inclusivity rather than exclusivity.
There is ongoing debate regarding the influential characteristics inhibiting or
aiding democratic transitions. These arguments include institutional characteristics, such
as democratic structure – presidential system versus a parliamentary system (Kapstein
and Converse 2008, Linz and Stepan 1996) – political parties (Boix 2003, Schedler
2002), and political efficacy (Huntington 1991); structural components, such as income
levels (Lipset 1959, Dahl 1971, Przeworski, et al. 2000), ethnic diversity (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2008), education (Boix 2003), and class differences (Rueschmeyer, et al.
1992); and cultural facets (Silva, et al. 2013). The vast array of competing literature
reaches to solve the dilemma of what ultimately causes the erosion of a new democracy.
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  Data collected from Freedom House compilation, Country Ratings and Status, 1973-2014.
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There is no clear cut answer which resolves this issue. The study of democratic transition
has only come to the forefront of political science discussions in recent decades. With
the advent of democracy-promotion and nation-building the need for a clear theoretical
argument regarding democratic transitions becomes an increasingly high priority.
The comprehensive arguments presented in the previous decades ultimately
present incontrovertible reasoning that there is no singular answer which solves the
sustained crisis of democratic backslide. As Carothers (2002) asserts, a new approach is
required in addressing the stagnation of the transition paradigm. The multiplicity of
indicators which academics have consistently utilized in addressing and theorizing
democratic transitions must be expanded upon to remain beneficial. Broadly speaking,
what works for one state does not work for another; in short, there is no perfect answer to
explicate democratic default. Overall, we must endeavor to bring greater and more
complex variables into the established equations to determine the way democracy is
measured and the chances of democratic stability hypothesized.

The

process for

democratization used for one state in a solitary region of the world may not be applicable
to another state, even within the same area. No two state’s are identical, and therefore
academics, NGOs, IGOs, developed states, cannot prescribe a one-size-fits-all solution.
As the complexities of nation-building grow – while intergovernmental relations continue
in perpetuity – greater inclusivity of multiple and new variables will be necessary to
prevent, examine, and address democratic backslide.
This thesis will examine the structural, institutional, and cultural justifications for
the advancement, or decline, of a democratic state. Moreover, this thesis alleges the
arguments presented thus far in terms of democratic backslide have provided a number of
4	
  

	
  
differing opinions and results, exhibiting multiple interpretations for the decline of a
democratic regime. Indeed, there appears to be a need for more critical proposals for
solving the continuing issue of states failing to retain democratic practices or remain as a
democratic state. The need for a concise structure for how to achieve democracy may
overall prove ineffective. Some states exhibit an ability to function in a form that largely
abstains from broad democratic norms and procedures (Carothers 2002).

For instance,

state-sponsored inequality, however undemocratic or illiberal, can prove to benefit the
stability of a nation-state (Shoup 2011). The continuity of a sovereign state gives outside
forces less credibility in attempting to force the nation to become a full-fledged
democracy. Consequently, the conditions of ‘success’ for one state may not translate into
a working status for another. Therefore, a pure democratic state is not a prerequisite for
stability.
The status of many sovereign states have been categorized as democratic. By the
most basic standards used to classify a state as a democracy this has given rise to a
disproportionate amount of states being classified as fully democratic (Carothers 2002).
However, under greater scrutiny many professedly democratic states possess illiberal
characteristics. Why should a change in democratic theorization matter? An overarching conjecture of this thesis asserts if a state exhibits non-liberal characteristics and
practices this does not automatically qualify the state as a failed state. However, at the
opposite end of the spectrum, a state exhibiting minimal democratic characteristics
cannot be so easily classified as a democratic state. The ability of a state to function in a
non-liberal capacity is valid, this is not to say violent inequality or characteristics of that
nature are justifiable. Non-liberal practices may provide continuity for a state. The key
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concern is stability and the absence of violence. The following sections will additionally
show that success based on whether a nation has sustained the amalgam of thresholds
quantifying democracies is outdated, consequently what works for one state may not
necessarily work for another.
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CHAPTER II
DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING
A State in Regression
Democratic backslides are a fundamental factor in regime changes. Scholars of
democratization have increasingly focused on the non-linear nature of regime change.
Despite the apparent local and international support for participatory democracies, many
states have experienced backslides that have replaced emergent democratic institutions
with more authoritarian features. Literature on the topic of democratic backslide has
illustrated a wide array of causes. In this thesis, I propose that higher degrees of ethnic
fractionalization accompanied with state newness are correlated with an increased
likelihood of democratic backslides. However, the majority of literature supports two
main arguments for causes of democratic backslide. Scholars attribute causation of
backslides to either structural or institutional faults. This thesis will suggest that ethnic
splintering is a primary contributing cause of backslides, however, ethnic heterogeneity is
not the only cause of democratic backslide. When ethnic heterogeneity is coupled with
other detrimental factors (for example: state newness or inequality) we observe an
interaction effect that increases the likelihood that democracy will yield political conflict
that is detrimental to stability. Furthermore, an examination of policies under a handful of
states which have undergone democratic backslide will be utilized to advance the claims
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of this thesis. This will provide evidence as to whether there are similarities in policies
between states that have witnessed democratic backslide.
The literature encompassing democratic backslide and ethnic fractionalization is
shown to gravitate to two groupings of causality variables: institutional and structural.
Alemán and Yang (2011) highlight a break between scholars in explaining the
relationship between ethnic fractionalization and democracy or other semi-democratic
variations. Various scholars suggest that ethnic fractionalization weakens autocratic
regimes while also straining democratic stability if the fractionalization reinforces
socioeconomic-based cleavages (Alemán and Yang 2011; Collier 2007: 49-50;
Rueschemeyer, et al. 1992: 49). Alemán and Yang move to underscore the contrasting
theory, stating, “others argue that ethnically diverse societies facilitate democratic
consolidation since they generate less pressure for redistribution” (2011). Furthermore,
Boix (2003: 79-80) utilizes ethnic fractionalization as a control variable, consequently
finding that this variable has no significant effect on democratic transitions, but does
undermine consolidation. Additional studies of a comparable nature have determined
ethnic fractionalization plays a contributing factor. In Jensen and Skaaning’s (2012)
study, they assert ethnic fractionalization does, indeed, present a negative impact on
modernization of nation-states, with low fractionalization representing a positive impact
on democratization. This is in contrast to other scholar’s assertions, which find ethnic
fractionalization is not statistically significant in backslide models, but suggest ethnic
pluralism and democratic stability is likely inured by supplementary variables (Alemán
and Yang 2011).
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Naturally, there are discrepancies between scholars on these issues. Alesina and
Glaeser suggest ethnically diverse societies generate lower levels of redistribution versus
more homogenous cultures; overall, states exhibiting drastically reduced ethnic strife
demonstrate greater levels of redistribution (2004: 180-181). Redistributive pressures on
states demonstrate a major hurdle in the consolidation of new democracies, thus ethnic
heterogeneity would in fact enhance democratic stability (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006:
43), thus implying greater chances of democratic continuity. Therefore, following the
aforementioned assertions, greater ethnic heterogeneity would lead to less pressure for
redistribution, thus producing less overall instability.
This is in contrast to bipolar states, which exemplify a predilection for democratic
inequality and have a tendency to incorporate semi-democratic practices (Shoup 2014).
Owing to their ethnic heterogeneity, bipolar states exhibit greater likelihood for
redistribution as seen in Malaysia, Fiji, and Sri Lanka, among others (Shoup 2011).
When inequalities are widespread, further repression of the electorate and thus a break in
democratic governance display a greater chance of democratic regression (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2006: 191-193). These conclusions add resonance to the claims of this thesis,
which contend ethnic heterogeneity, when combined with an emerging democracy will
cause defaults in their democratic status. The discrepancies between academics illustrate
the wide and varying opinions with regard to the effects of ethnic fractionalization and
associated factors dictating democratic stability.
Theoretical Conjectures
Due to the disparate research and conclusions, further analysis of the effects of
ethnic heterogeneity and political modernization may be beneficial. There is not one set
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factor which contributes to the collapse of a democratic state, it is a multi-dimensional
failure, a fusion of competing factors which ultimately force democracy to its knees.
Where ethnic heterogeneity is concerned, competing ethnic groups begin to vie for power
to retain the premiership and control of the state. Democratic transitions threaten to
devolve power from a single source or institution to multiple arenas, thus diffusing power
of any single group, integrating any excluded minority groups into what may have been a
single-party system with control by an autochthonous group. This threat of devolution of
power will cause the threatened ethnic group to mobilize in a fashion which will continue
to place them at the frontier of any political transitions.
The overarching hypothetical theme of this thesis combines ethnic heterogeneity,
institutional, structural, and cultural variables, and regime type to suggest that democratic
backslides are the result of multiple causes. For a liberal democratic state to function in
an inclusive pluralistic state, all groups must be recognized and involved in the
democratic process. For an ethnic group with a majority share to assert asymmetric
claims, this belies the democratic process, forcing minority groups to submit to the
already majority-holding faction. Institutional acquiescence to the claims of inequality
thus skew democratic transition, pushing states to a form of illiberal democracy. Stability
in lieu of a liberal democracy is the end-result. This raison d’état may put certain social
or ethnic groups at a political disadvantage, however, the forfeiture of certain rights
allows continuity and stability of a state to progress in a functioning capacity.
I ultimately argue that ethnic heterogeneity is not, by itself, adequate to imperil
democratic institutions. Instead, I will argue that the combination of state “newness” and
elevated levels of ethnic heterogeneity generate particular incentives for political
9	
  

	
  
mobilization.

Moreover, newly formed states must create institutions for popular

governance. The process of institutional design is often misinterpreted by ethnic groups
as an opportunity for other communities to make themselves indispensible for future
political negotiations. This process compels ethnic impresarios to assert themselves as
indispensable actors in any future system.

This creates an imbalance, forcing any

changes in democratic regime to be vetted through the ethnically dominate group, thus
creating a spiral regime susceptible to democratic backslide.

Similarly, asymmetric

policy claims by one ethnic community compel groups to make state institutions
dependent upon the support of one ethnic group (typically a majority or large plurality).
Where ethnic heterogeneity is present there is a justifiable cause for concern by the
academic and international community. This factor does not automatically doom an
emerging state from becoming fully democratic, however, when other factors are present,
the collision of these factors cause democratic deterioration.
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CHAPTER III
REGIME CLASSIFICATION
Democratic Thresholds
The cause of democratic backslide has been attributed to two differing arguments.
One school of thought alleges that backslide is caused by a defect in the structural makeup of the society in question. In contrast lies the school of thought that rests its argument
on institutional deficiencies as the cause for democratic deterioration.

Democratic

backslides are not a new phenomenon; this process has been occurring year after year in
various parts of the world, with constant transitions of government between authoritarian,
democratic, semi-authoritarian, and a wide variety of differing regime-types between
these categories. Due to the volatile nature of politics in the developing world this is
unlikely to subside in the near future.
The aforementioned work covers a broad, but exhaustive definition of a
democratic regime. Schumpeter asserts that for a state to be considered a democratic
state free, fair and competitive elections must be held which produce representatives that
are held accountable by their majority electorate to act and vote in a manner which they
deem acceptable and in accordance with their opinions; this legitimacy then provides the
elected officials cause to produce a stable government (1947). This can be put into even
more simplistic terms: a political system enters into the realm of democracy when
governments are formed “through a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”
11	
  

	
  
(Schumpeter 1947: 269). Similarly, Dahl holds the leading characteristics of democratic
– polyarchic – structures are free and fair elections, with universal suffrage, in addition to
high levels of participation and open contestation (1971: 3). This, however, is further
expanded upon under Dahl’s quantification of democracy which notes states must also
allow the freedom for organizations to develop among the electorate, the freedom of
expression, and establishing institutions which depend on the electorate for legitimization
(Dahl 1971: 3). The established definition of democracy conceptualized by Robert Dahl
has remained steadfast for some time, however. Dahl (1971) provides determinants for
qualifying a state as a democracy – more specifically, a polyarchy by Dahl’s definition –
in a variety of ways, which has been sustained as the benchmark to delineate whether a
state can be defined as a democracy.

Absent these characteristics a state would

presumably fall into the category of a non-democracy. Dahl holds that for a nation-state
to fall into the category of a democracy certain guarantees must be made (1971: 3).
These guarantees include the freedom of expression – permitting the electorate to choose
for themselves a candidate, government, organization – additionally, once these are
chosen, the electorate is allowed to participate in free and fair elections, voting for the
candidates of their choosing; moreover, the “institutions for making government policies
depend on votes and other expressions of preference” for legitimacy and continuity
(1971: 3). Thus when these characteristics are seen within a state the state can be defined
as a democracy – or as Dahl has defined as a polyarchy. Huntington builds this definition
of democracy deeper vis-à-vis Dahl and Schumpeter, stating a system achieves
democratic status when “its most powerful collective decision makers are selected
through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes”
12	
  

	
  
(1991: 7). Free and fair elections are necessary factors – with opposition parties given
the ability to contest the elections without fear of retribution, in addition to universal
suffrage – for a state to be considered democratic (1991: 7). Additionally, a state must
exhibit checks and balances of power to avoid political actors from gaining authoritarian
supremacy, while also maintaining an overall stability throughout the governmental
framework – for instance, the ability to maintain voter participation – for a state to be
democratic (1991: 10-12). The definitions of democracy provided by Schumpeter, Dahl,
and Huntington have provided the fundamental, yet pertinent benchmarks of democracy
utilized by countless academics, which will additionally be utilized in this thesis.
The definitions discussed have provided a pertinent standard in determining
whether a nation has reached the point for classification as a democracy or whether the
state has moved in the opposite direction. These conceptualizations will allow for a
minimalist approach in determining whether a state has undergone a democratic
transition from a free and fair democracy to that of a non-democratic state. Given the
influx in literature regarding the classifications of regime-types (Diamond 2002; Levitsky
and Way 2002; Schedler 2002) it is difficult to squarely place a regime in a certain
category. The competing literature shows an intertwining of the varying classifications
of political systems, from democratic to pure authoritarian, and a multiplicity of differing
possibilities in between. Therefore, in order to provide greater scuritinaztion this thesis
will employ the prior definitions of a democratic system put forth by Schumpeter (1947),
Dahl (1971), and Huntington (1991).

Moreover, the standards set by Dahl (1971),

Huntington (1991), and Schumpeter (1947) have been utilized in the measurement of
democracy to a great degree of constructiveness throughout the years by innumerable
13	
  

	
  
scholars, therefore, their work will be utilized here in setting a threshold for whether a
nation classifies as a democracy or has shown signs of regression.
The discussed democratic thresholds, however, are not completely exhaustive of
the many facets of indicators which provide whether a nation-state has met the
democratic threshold or retreated from it. Dahl’s “concept of polyarchy is limited to the
most basic institutional requirements for democracy” (Coppedge and Reinicke 1990),
therefore to properly measure whether democracy has been attained, remained static, or
withdrawn, other characteristics are necessary for proper measurement. Scholars have
shown the definition of democracy can be rather simple or rather complex. In a more
complex setting, democracy entails open contestation over the right to win control of
government with free and fair elections, freedom of the press, individual and personal
safeguards of freedom, redistribution of income, freedom of the working classes, and
institutions legitimately accepted by the public (Linz and Stepan 1996: 3-6). Democracy
is not a simple concept that has a universal definition, it is multifaceted with many
working classifications.

As noted above, characterizations of what constitutes a

democracy and the benchmarks for attaining democratic status have fluctuated
throughout the years. This debate, however, appears to conclude that for a democracy to
reach the benchmark to be declared a legitimate democracy the following traits must be
present: electoral, liberal majoritarian, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian
(Coppedge, et al. 2011).

In addition to the prior-referenced characteristics of a

democracy, additional conclusive distinctions have become commonplace amongst
scholars, such as minority protections, universal suffrage, sovereignty, contestation,
check and balances, separation of powers, descriptive representation, and the protection
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of liberties through constitutional means (Coppedge 2012: 313; Zakaria 1997). The
characteristics of a democracy vary widely. From Dahl’s simple definition of a polyarchy, which has been used to define and measure democracy to Coppedge, et al.’s
multidimensional definitions of what comprises a democracy. Without these characteristics a nation-state fails to fully attain a democratic standing.

Once again, these

standards have fluctuated throughout the debate of what constitutes democratic status.
The definition of democracy has been scrutinized repeatedly, with each
generation seemingly conceptualizing it further and presenting valid points for
modification of the definition. However, such simplistic classifications have lead to
quantifying an overabundance of states as democratic, despite these states lacking various
fundamental characteristics of a democratic state as prescribed above. A simplistic
definition of democracy places many unqualified states into the realm of developed,
democratic states, where under greater scrutinization would place them in a gray area or
semi-democratic state (Carothers 2002). Therefore, stricter definitions of democracy are
necessary to curtail over-inclusive definitions skewing data defining the amount of
democratic states. Surveying states under a heavier definition of what constitutes a
democracy may provide fewer states as true democracies.

Applying stringent

characteristics, such as a more comprehensive redistribution indicator or whether a state
was subject to a coup, would perhaps lead to fewer democratic states.
As states move in transitory periods back-and-forth across the thresholds of
democratic qualifications they enter into periods backslide, a regression from democratic
procedures.

There are multiple factors attributed to causing democratic backslide.

Backslide can be attributed to two competing causational theories: Structural variables
15	
  

	
  
versus institutional variables. These deficiencies are likely to be augmented by ethnic
differences and “newness” of the democratic state – both are subtypes of the structural
school – however additional factors are at work. To begin, I highlight a previous thought
from Mill: “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different
nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak
different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of the
representative government, cannot exist.” (1909: 495-496). This point provided by Mill
is an exceptional example regarding the difficulties facing heterogenic societies. Mill’s
insight will, in some form or another, be exhibited and addressed throughout this thesis.
Moreover, the utilization of competing and complimentary theories to structure a robust
examination of ethnic heterogeneity and democratic consolidation of newly formed states
will be pursued.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CAUSAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDE
Institutional Variables
The breakdown of newly formed institutions can, at times, be a leading cause for
democratic regression. Government structure, political parties, legitimacy are all factors
in the causation of democratic backsliding. Presidential systems versus parliamentary
systems exhibit causational roles in states undergoing democratic regression.

For

instance, “parliamentarism over time develops many incentives to produce coalitional
majorities,” opposed to “presidentialism [which] has far fewer coalition-inducing
incentives” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 181).

This can be attributed to the need for

cooperation in parliamentary systems between the executive and legislative branches to
form a coalition, thus forming a “mutual dependence” upon one another, whereas due to
separation of powers presidential systems carry on in a form of “mutual independence,”
thus while the predispositions of presidential systems may work to form “a highly
interactive system, [this also] work[s] to impede democratic consolidation” (Stepan and
Skach 1993). Republican presidential systems have shown to inhibit the growth of
democratic states. Moreover, Linz and Stepan find a majority of continuously stable
democratic states were based on parliamentary systems, while only a fraction were based
on a presidential system similar to that of the United States (1996: 141). This provides
evidence that parliamentary systems stand a greater chance for consolidation and survival
17	
  

	
  
compared to presidential systems. This exhibits data which shows both systems have a
probability of functioning over periods of time, however, to ensure continuity and
longevity nation-builders and developing countries will want to consider pushing
placement of a parliamentary system in newly forming democratic states.
Institutional factors run the chance of being tied with structural factors. Cheibub
takes the previous theories further by examining income growth and economic levels,
concluding that parliamentary democracies fair much better than presidential
democracies, with presidential democracies facing a greater threat for regression, despite
income inequalities (2007: 137-139). Notwithstanding income inequalities, a leading
determinant of whether a presidential or parliamentary democracy thrives or fails will be
the history of the country itself – whether the preceding the democratic installation was a
type of authoritarian regime, mixed-democracy, or other autocratic force (Cheibub 2007:
173). Therefore, as I will outline in subsequent sections, economics – as asserted by
various academics (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) – such as GDP, per capita
income and wealth, plays a minor role in the dissolution of a democratic government and
reversion to a quasi-authoritarian regime.
Parties, an instrumental tool for electoral mobilization, can be counterproductive
to democratic stability in a newly formed democratic society.

Weak opposition to

candidates of the old regime can result in members of the once-ruling regime regaining
power vis-à-vis legitimate democratic means due to party fractionalization (McFaul 2000:
23-24). Authoritarian incumbents can therefore “emerge victorious from transitional
elections” due to the folly and ineptitude of opposition parties to capitalize on the recent
regime’s downfall and the emergence of open elections (Schedler 2002: 42).
18	
  

	
  
Consequently, should the authoritarian incumbent exploit the opposition’s failure of
consolidation then the likelihood of the incumbent to revert to old policies is plausible as
they have now been legitimized through open, free, and democratic elections.
Accordingly, deposed autocratic leaders choosing to run can easily take advantage of the
incompetence of newly formed, unorganized parties, thus effectively marginalizing the
opposition and gaining enough support to emerge victoriously (Schedler 2000: 42).
These flaws within and between the parties can therefore have disastrous effects upon a
newly emerging democracy. Absent appropriate aptness by political leaders the state can
plunge back into a non-democratic state.
Government structure and political parties are not the only factors in determining
democratic breakdown.

The various political parties within that structure cause a

predisposition for authoritarian regimes to weaken, therefore where political parties are
absent the likelihood of democratic backslide is increased (Lai and Melkonian-Hoover
2005). Some states have altogether avoided “the establishment of political parties due to
fears of fractionalization, distrust, and instability,” however, as further indicated by Lai
and Melkonian-Hoover, “when parties are excluded, risks to the quality and sustainability
of democracy are significant and substantial” (2005: 562). Inclusion of factions, rather
than complete exclusion of factions facilitate the continuity of an established democratic
state. Overall, “party competition plays a significant and crucial role in the decline of
authoritarian states and the transition to democracy” (Lai and Melkonian-Hoover 2005:
562).

Should party competition become deteriorate the probability of democratic

backslide taking place would significantly increase.

Political factions thus breed

competition and allow for greater cooperation in democratic systems, harbor these and
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the rise of authoritarianism within the state is plausible, ultimately causing democratic
regression. Boix notes that institutions, namely political parties, can have positive and
adverse effects on regime survival based upon the amount of power an institution or party
can or does wield (2003: 143-144). Should these parties be disseminated along ethnic
lines, as subsequently discussed, then the outcomes may prove to be different, ultimately
becoming a hindrance to democratic growth.
The prior discussion is easily correlated to legitimacy as well. Deficiencies in
institutional legitimacy with the electorate promotes greater risk for democratic
deterioration. Huntington notes that, “new democracies are, in effect, in a catch-22
situation: lacking legitimacy they cannot become effective; lacking effectiveness they
cannot develop democracy” (1991: 258). For democratic institutions to be sustained they
must possess some degree of legitimacy. Providing the electorate with legitimacy and
promoting anti-corruption policies, trust in institutions will grow within the electorate
creating a stable environment for democratic and state continuity. Legitimacy intertwines
with both the institutional and structural aspects of a political system; it focuses upon the
institution and the electorate. As the electorate provides for the institution through
elections, however stability will only be generated if the electorate has faith in said
institutions, therefore providing essential legitimacy.
The age of a democracy is directly correlated to the subsistence of the democracy
– the younger a democracy the more likely it faces a possible breakdown (Kapstein and
Converse 2008). As I contend, democratic stability holds when multiple factors have
coalesced positively, the age of a democracy being a pillar of that stability. Older
democracies are shown to withstand time, therefore, permanence of a democracy is a key
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characteristic in postulating whether a state will survive. The amount of time since the
commencement of a democratic installment coupled with the extent of ethnic
heterogeneity will be leading determinants in democratic stability.
The plausibility of the aforementioned characteristics to be contributing factors to
democratic backslide are compelling in and of themselves. However, most institutional
variables are not solely to blame. The majority of developing states are plagued with a
dysfunctional coupling of institutional and structural variables. Therein lies a major
component of this thesis, therefore the following will discuss the structural causes of
democratic regression, in which lies a subordinate and supporting argument – the effects
of ethnic heterogeneity – of this thesis and probable instrumental cause of democratic
backslide.
Structural Variables
Scholars have argued both the institutional and structural causal relations to
democratic backsliding.

This section will allow for the robust theoretical views

associated with the causation of democratic backslide.
Economics is a continual argument associated with the cause democratic
regression. The most notable coming from Seymour Lipset (1959), arguing income
levels are directly correlated to the development of democracy, with higher levels of
income developing and maintaining a democratic system of government. Furthermore,
the increase of wealth in a nation helps enable the middle class to flourish by allowing
investment to change the social conditions of the working class, and therefore causing an
upward mobility of the lower-working classes to the middle class (Lipset 1959). The
middle class consistently plays a significant role in “moderating conflict since it is able to
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reward moderate and democratic parties and penalize extremist groups,” therefore
increased wealth of the middle-class will assist in promoting a democratic government
(Lipset 1959). According to Lipset, the main cause for democratic development and
continuity is a wealthy state benefiting the lower and middle classes.
The literature builds on this oft-repeated view, that the emergence of a democracy
is significantly based on wealth and development. Income inequality and affluence of a
society are better determinants with respect to the longevity and survival rate of a newly
formed democracy, essentially speaking, poverty breeds poverty, which in turns breeds
authoritarianism (Przeworski, et al. 1996: 49). However, the overarching characteristic
for determining democratic survival is development, which is predicated upon the per
capita income of a state – the higher the per capita income, the greater the likelihood of a
democratic state being established and surviving (Przeworski, et al 1996: 123-125).
Przeworski, et al.’s comprehensive study of 2000 built upon this even further, asserting
that socioeconomic conditions are the greatest factor in determining whether a democracy
fails or survives – absent these conditions, the likelihood of failure increases
exponentially (123-125, 137). Likewise, the failure of a nation’s economic structures,
arrangements which benefit the wealthy, namely, will ultimately lead to the country’s
political failure, as this structure will only continue to be lead by the actors that are
reaping the benefits, yet simultaneously harboring the economic institutions (Acemoglu
and Robinson 2012: 372). The overwhelming literature diametrically presents evidence
that economics plays a strong role in the outcome of a state’s democratic status and its
further continuity. However, as presented above, this thesis contends economics is not
the only factor leading to destabilization and ultimate democratic regression.
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contention of this thesis rests on multiple factors which the above writings have
contended rests mainly in the field of economics.

Further examination is needed,

however.
In addition to economic inequality between the classes, economic growth overall
has been shown to lead to a democratic regression. The greater rapidity of growth of an
economy the more probable the state will progress as a democratic state (Przeworski, et
al 2000: 109, 123).

Economic growth has the ability to hamper instability, thus

appeasing the masses; the greater the growth the more likely any form of political
upheaval will be curtailed allowing for government continuity (Haggard and Kaufman
1995: 325-326). Economics is not the sole causation for democratic instability, a leading
predictor, however, as I claim, not the singular reasoning for democratic instability,
which lie in a combination of factors.
There is no doubt that economic development of a state is important in
determining survival rates of a nation. However, further transition to or from democracy
may be due to completely random events or factors (Przeworski, et al. 2000: 137).
Economics may only be one small piece of a vast puzzle that continues to be reexamined
and reevaluated. Economics continue to play a vital role in the democratization of state,
however, there are other competing factors which contribute to the continued existence of
an established state, such as education levels, legitimacy, and the involvement of the elite
to ensure certain political objectives are met which will lead to the formation of a
democratic state (Boix 2003: 236). Similarly, class differences have also been shown to
play a defining role in the end result of democratization of a state. The economic
conditions within a state will assist in the democratization of a state, or lack thereof,
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whilst also facilitating class distinctions within the state (Boix 2003: 5). Economics, as
alleged above, is an integral factor in democratic continuity. Dahl notes this is his
seminal work stating: “The chances that a country will develop and maintain a
competitive political regime. . . depend upon the extent to which the country’s society
and economy. . . prevent extreme inequalities among the potentially relevant strata of the
country” (1971: 74). The gross national product of a country has been found to similarly
be an indicator of whether a state moves away from a pluralistic democracy to an
authoritarian regime. The greater the GNP and overall output of a country – a strong
indication of wealth – strong links to the continuity of a democratic state exist; moreover,
states devoid of this characteristic are likely to slide into a non-democratic status (Hannan
and Carroll 1981).

Economic factors present concise indicators for state stability.

Economic indicators are not the only indicator as work in this complex equation.
As economic growth can be a leading factor in the persistence of a democratic
state, however, excessive involvement in the markets can be a hindrance to democratic
development. Tang and Woods (2012) find economic development can, indeed, be a
contributing feature to ensuring democratic stability, however, disproportionate
involvement by the state in economic stability can lead to a decline in democracy and
lead to a more authoritarian state.

Ethnically-based redistribution policies display

disproportionate economic policies predominantly favoring majority ethnic groups
(Shoup 2011). State-sponsored programs exhibiting preferential treatment to certain
ethnic factions demonstrates incommensurate economic practices which have a direct
correlation to political upheaval, thus causing an increased probability for democratic
backslide to occur. A fine balance must be practiced to secure a stable democracy,
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slightly inclining the scales may cause a backslide in any democracy, be this in economic
structures, class, or ethnic divisions.
Economic divisions certainly play a defining role in whether a nation-state
survives or regresses from some form of a democratic status. There are supplementary
characteristics which play into democratic backslide as well, however. Class restrictions
must be alleviated for a democracy to flourish. Deep divisions between the classes will
only harden with downturns in economic status, thus cementing any electoral divisions.
Moreover, class divisions restrict society, therefore for democracy to build and grasp any
stability, inclusion of all classes – not merely the ruling elite – in particular the working
class and “petty bourgeoisie” (Rueschemyer, et al. 1992: 50). The strong interdependent
relationship between structural and institutional characteristics foreshadow weaknesses in
democratic permanence when obligatory democratic attributes are positioned for
accomplishment with substandard thresholds.
There is no question as to the importance of the previously discussed variables
affecting democratic backslide. However, the collision of multiple elemental failures
raises awareness for backslide.

A deeply influential variable in many emerging

democracies is ethnic heterogeneity – as has been manifested throughout the history of
countless states, sovereign or territorial. The competing literature in this realm portrays
the extensive the effects of ethnic fractionalization. Ethnic homogeneity helps to create a
collective national identity, in contrast to ethnic heterogeneity where ethnic factions see
to retain their indigenous identity into political forums. Ethnically diverse states with
democratic political structures that allow for the continuation of ethnic divisions are
volatile to destabilization and regression to an authoritarian system (Hannan and Carroll
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1981).

In the early stages of democratic development ethnic fractionalization may

obstruct the basic and fundamental provisions needed for democracy to flourish, such as
economic structures and institutional structures, however, absent these a state is likely to
regress to a non-democratic state (Easterly 2001).
Democratic regression is the culmination of many factors colliding, however, one
distinguishing and similar factor must be present throughout the copious amounts of
evidence and many exampled of democratic failure. The volatile nature of ethnically
heterogeneous societies hinder democratic progress.

Volatility in itself puts any

progressive liberalizing actions in jeopardy, this only magnifies with the presence of
violence.

Casey and Owen (2014) do not find “evidence that income inequality

consistently affects institutions in a statistically significant way. . . [however] results for
ethnic fractionalization show many signs of persistent conflict in the development of
effective institutions”. Absent ethnic fractionalization a state may have a greater
probability of successfully navigating the tumultuous transition from a non-democratic
state to stable democracy. Combining ethnic heterogeneity with similar structural or
differing institutional faults present a heavier likeliness for democratic decomposition. In
a similar vein, Rueschmeyer, et al. (1992) find ethnic fractionalization becomes
increasingly important when it is associated with class separation; these distinct ethnic
divisions can deepen class divisions, thus increasing a likelihood of democratic
breakdown (1992: 48-49). Moreover, ethnic heterogeneity in freshly formed democracies
may provide leverage for a majority ethnic group to increase the fractionalization by
asserting veto power due to the size of the plurality.
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Ethnic fractionalization does, indeed, cause democracy to be abandoned should
one group feel disadvantaged by an opposing ethnic group in power; ethnic divisions thus
cause resistance and subvert democracy, leading to a backlash and resistance by the
opposition parties sensing imbalanced practices in governance (Horowitz 1993). If the
opposing party is disadvantaged or ethnic diversities are exacerbated a deterioration of
democratic institutional and structural variables is plausible. Ethnically diverse states are
more likely to experience civil unrest in newly formed states, thus leading to a probable
erosion of democratic institutions and state stability (Blimes 2006). This thesis therefore
posits that the overarching issue facing whether a state succeeds or deteriorates from
democracy is the coalescing of ethnic composition and age of the democracy. In some
rare cases multifarious states are able to bridge the divides between ethnic factions, where
this is unfeasible steps by the state to ensure inclusivity of all ethnic groups will be
requisite in state continuity.
This review of the literature shows a very interconnected pattern of the various
traits that contribute to a digression of democratic qualities and ultimate regression from
democracy. Furthermore, the studies and literature examined thus far have established
that democratic backslide is not due to one factor, but can be the consequence of multiple
factors converging. For instance, when examining the structural variables attributed to
democratic regression, much of the literature credits democratic backslide as a causation
of single premier variable. This research has yielded a different result, concluding with
the hypothetical positions taken that multiple factors are the determinants associated with
democratic backslide. The unpredictable and haphazard nature of electoral politics, state
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formation, and ethnic strife can cause a predisposition for both the failure and success of
recently formed democratic states.
Cultural Variables
The research attributing cultural variables to democratic backslide has shown
minimal results, and what research has been conducted has displayed varied results. As
noted above, most academics attribute democratic breakdown to an institutional or
structural argument, appearing to altogether dismiss any cultural features that may be a
predisposing factor to democratic breakdown. However, the cultural participation one
chooses and immerses themselves in (e.g. the arts, religion, unions, clubs) has shown to
vary.

Generally speaking, culture has been found to increase political activities,

providing positive consequences, such as voting turnout and protestation (da Silva, et al.
2013). These activities may inhibit democracy or foster it. Should the group one is
involved with be some form of violent organization with intentions to foster instability to
overthrow a democratically elected government, is that defined as cultural participation
and thus a factor in democratic backslide? Additional information and in-depth analysis
is needed to fully realize whether cultural variables take part in democratic subversion or
whether, as da Silva, et al. (2013) found, cultural involvement produces positive results
for democratic stability. Therefore, will a promotion of cultural involvement in newly
formed states assist in decreasing any discrepancies between opposing ethnic factions?
This is a question which can be answered with further research into the socio-political
aspects of democratic backslide.
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Ethnic Heterogeneity and Asymmetric Claims
The extensive discussion of institutional, structural and cultural variables
provided have built a comprehensive argument for each element that forces pressure
against an unstable democratic state. As the thesis claims, ethnic heterogeneity alone
cannot be a determining factor in state failure, however, it can be a key contributing
factor when coupled with other destabilizing elements. Ethnic heterogeneity may itself
not cause a decline in democratic stability. When an ethnic group asserts asymmetric
claims due to their indigenous status, destabilization is likely to occur. Ethnic majorities
will only mobilize against ethnic minorities when minorities do not acquiesce to a ethnic
hierarchy, giving autochthonous, majority ethnic groups a premier status in electoral
politics (Shoup 2014). Exclusive governance by a majority ethnic group will imperil a
newly formed democratic state. In order for modernizing states to become reach stability
state institutions must be over-inclusive.

Such collective governance will allow all

interested parties, autochthonous or otherwise, to participate in the process of
governance. Professedly dominant groups prefer to only democratize so far as to provide
the domestic and international communities with a reasonable reassurance that pluralistic
politics are taking place, while also protecting their own status as the privileged ethnic
group (Shoup 2014).

This continuation of discriminatory governance only inhibits

democratic and economic growth. For full participatory democratic standards to be met,
quelling asymmetric claims by autochthonous groups are necessary. By providing for
asymmetric policy claims, international and domestic communities acquiesce to
misrepresentation, all but ensuring the rise of an authoritarian state – or illiberal
democracy – thus presenting a clear path for democratic regression.
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Asymmetric claims by ethnic majority groups, or a large plurality, shift the focus
of state institutions from the collective plurality to assuaging a single ethnic majority.
Postcolonial states such as Malaysia, Fiji, and Sri Lanka exhibit government appeasement
to ethnically autochthonous groups, where electoral privilege by majority ethnic factions
trumps basic democratic pillars (Shoup 2011, 2014). Bipolar or ethnically heterogeneous
postcolonial states display the greatest hurdles for implementing a fully democratic state
based on ethnic fractionalization and the overall newness of the state itself. States with
ethnically-based redistribution policies may exhibit stability, such as Malaysia (Shoup
2011, 2014), however, stability comes at the cost of full democratic integration, thereby
continually remaining in an illiberal state. What democratic policies ethnically diverse
states do have are belied by asymmetrical claims. Dominant ethnic groups assert their
majority powers by skewing the political atmosphere in a way which will best serve their
interests. Democratic government institutions may be present within a sovereign state,
however, due to inequitable electoral practices favoring the large plurality, these
democratic institutions are merely a veneer shrouding semi-authoritarian practices to
appease domestic and international calls for a purely representative state.
Postcolonial states face strong impediments in prevailing over non-democratic
practices.

State consolidation favoring one ethnic faction over another was largely

solidified under colonial conditions. Giving preferential treatment to one ethnic group
over the other leads to illiberal and exclusionary democratic practices which ultimately
induce democratic deterioration.

Moreover, deliberate moves by newly formed

postcolonial governments to provide privileged electoral statuses to majority ethnic
groups causes resentment by “inferior” groups, consequently providing a basis for
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potential minority mobilization and unrest. Autochthonous groups express difficulty in
coalescing with minority groups, where powerful groups are promoting autochthonous
identities to overrule national identities, therefore to form a national, all-inclusive identity
proves unacceptable to autochthonous groups in postcolonial states (Shoup 2011).
Subverting calls for a national identity forces developing states to act to avoid ethnic
splintering. Predominant ethnic groups mobilize to take advantage of ethnic fracturing
by calling for reforms which cause majority ethnic groups to become indispensible in
forming a coherent government. Government concessions to asymmetric demands only
works to threaten the stability of newly formed governments. States exhibiting high
levels of ethnic fractionalization combined with the moderate age of the state virtually
guarantee substandard development, showcasing high probability for democratic
backslide. Expectations of democratic backslide are only increased when any of the
unfavorable characteristics previously mentioned are present. Therefore, to diminish
threats to democratic stability precautions by newly formed states to control asymmetric
claims must be undertaken. This thesis seeks to elucidate the underlying, as well as
overarching, points of issue facing newly formed democracies.

It is critical ethnic

fractionalization be immediately addressed in ethnically heterogeneous states, with
significant attention being paid to newer democratic states.
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CHAPTER V
A CRITICAL CASE STUDY OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Methodology
The aforementioned studies and conjectures outline the polarizing research and
conclusions, which have been made in support of, and against, the effects of ethnic
fractionalization, democratic consolidation, and ethnic bipolarity of states in relation to
democratic backsliding and modernization.

Due to the disparate research and

amalgamation of conclusions, further analysis of the hurdles facing democratic
consolidation is beneficial.

The above-referenced studies have taken precedent in

analyzing the effects of ethnic fractionalization and democratic age on backslide.
However, a change in, or inclusion of, additional variables will be beneficial. This will
conceivably shed new light on the study of democratization within developing
democracies and democratic states currently in a midpoint zone.
To put the aforementioned positions into a working, analytical format, an analysis
using a critical case study will be utilized. A comprehensive analysis of Papua New
Guinea will be undertaken to assist in exhibiting the hypothetical assertions I have
elaborated upon throughout this thesis. Papua New Guinea is a complex state which
shows extensive evidence and characteristics relating to ethnic heterogeneity, and
democratic backslide, in addition to a myriad of structural and institutional variables
which typify democratic regression. The measurement of democratic backslide is not an
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easy task to undertake despite the plethora of literature discussing contributions to
backslide. Moreover, based on the enigmatic and complex case of Papua New Guinea, a
critical case study would bring to light the multi-faceted political and socioeconomic
demographics of this remarkable, but bewildering state.

A state, which given its

disparate socioeconomic composition should certainly be in a democratic regression, if
following the standards set by academics as previously illustrated.

This model of

research will permit a more complete evaluation of a specific type of ethnic
heterogeneity, democratic age, and its effects on democratization, stability, and growth.
Papua New Guinea: An Enigma of Postcolonial Development
Papua New Guinea is an Asian-Oceanic state, comprising the eastern half of the
world’s second largest island New Guinea, or Papua Island. Colonization of Papua New
Guinea (PNG) began developing in the late 1880s, with initial colonization of the eastern
half of the island by German and British forces, with the Dutch administering the western
half. The eastern colony was split between British and German forces with Britain
controlling the southern area of PNG, while Germany administered the northern half of
the territory. During the early 1900s the administration of the entire eastern territory of
PNG was transferred to Australia, who would subsequently administer the island nation
through both world wars until independence was negotiated in the early 1970s. This
would eventually create an easier path for Papua New Guinea to become an independent
sovereign state in 1975. Like many other former colonial territories, Papua New Guinea
adopted a system of government similar to that of its former administrator, thusly PNG
adopted a Westminster-style system from Australia (Lipset 1989: 388). However, what
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this critical case study exhibits is a radical departure from their former colonial master’s
system of stable government.
Like many postcolonial states, PNG saw times of turmoil and volatility. PNG, by
numerical observations is a relatively young state, however, despite constant claims of
fragility by outside commentators, is one of few postcolonial states to maintain a
relatively uninterrupted record of democratic government (May 2003, 2013). The island
nation of PNG is a highly heterogenic state. The small nation-state sustains a population
of roughly 6.5 million, thousands of differing ethno-linguistic groups – many utilizing
dissimilar languages, by some accounts these number approximately 800 – customs, and
cultural practices, make PNG one of the most ethnically heterogeneous states in the world
(Reilly 2004, 2008). These statistics alone have been causes of concern and causes
célèbre for academics alike attempting to establish predictors for democratic vulnerability
and state success. PNG’s weak economic status (2013 per capita income of $2,900)
coupled with high ethnic heterogeneity undoubtedly mark the state as being vulnerable to
democratic regression.2 This is further illuminated by Papua New Guinea’s low human
development index ranking of 157 of 187 states.3

Both indicators of poor state

performance and symptomatic of democratic regression.
The highly fractionalized nature of PNG has lead to the organization of a loose
multi-party system, with no two dominant political parties reigning over electoral
practices and exhibiting a predictable outcome (Reilly 1999, May 2006). These political
parties of Papua New Guinea tend to be defined by regional and ethnic differences versus
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2

GDP data collected from United States Central Intelligence Agency “World Fact Book.”
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pp.html
3
UNDP, Human Development Report 2014, Table 1: Human Development Index and its components.
http://hdr.undp.org/
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traditional cleavages based on class or ideologies (May 2006). Therefore, the immense
amount of ethnically based parties due to the high ethnic heterogeneity aids in dispersing
power throughout the nation, rather than concentrating political power in one ethnically
dominant group, thus increasing the chance for ethnic entrepreneurialism to flourish as
ethnic groups will begin to feel they are disadvantaged due to their lack of power.
In ethnically diverse countries without national identities, such as PNG, a
person’s principal allegiance will remain with their clan or tribal groups (Reilly 2004).
Broad ethnic heterogeneity within countries characteristically leads to the absence of a
national identity for constituents to rally beneath. This lends to the fact PNG sees highly
fractured voting patterns. When candidates stand for election their votes are traditionally
sourced from their clan, or from other groups with close relations to their clan; the
candidates and their respective clans do this in hopes of marshaling additional resources
from the government, due to the premier status of parliamentarians (Reilly and Phillpot
2002). This essential rent-seeking culture leads national politics to become marginalized,
while local political goals take precedent over the collective good of the state. The clans
and their respective electoral representatives become interests groups seeking to extract
as many resources from that state as possible to benefit their electorate, generally their
clan, which undermines the expansive interests of PNG society collectively (Reilly and
Phillpot 2002). Such fractionalization is instigated by national leaders and ethnic groups
through clan-based politics rather than nation-wide politics. This perpetuates a sense of
exclusivity as opposed to inclusivity, increasing ethnic divisions between competing
factions.
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Such characteristics would be cause for a reduction in democratic means in other
states has shown to sustain peace in PNG. Rather than form legitimate political parties,
ethnic units work as a political-interest group, working to further the interests of the
single ethno-political group, subverting national, collective ideas in favor of seeking to
monopolize and control public goods (Reilly 2004). Absent a cohesive party system,
components of this highly diverse society’s political structure will remain fractured, thus
inhibiting governmental and economic growth.

Additionally, group allegiances are

perpetuated to ensure mobilization of similar ethno-linguistic factions to “acquire and
then monopolize control of actual and potential goods” (Reilly and Phillpot 2002).
Blatant exploitation of the democratic electoral system within PNG solidifies ethnic
tensions.

Formation of a national identity, rather than perpetuating ethnic

fractionalization is a probable solution to ethnic groups’ continual rent-seeking practices
and autochthonous claims of rights to resources (Reilly 2002). However, Papua New
Guinea, despite the constant threats of secession by various provinces, civil war,
economic impediments, and high ethno-linguistic fractionalization, illustrates volatile
states can prove to survive continuously and successfully by varying academic standards
(Reilly 1999, 2000, 2004). Continuous democratic classification of PNG by various
academics and developed states, has endured since its independence, notwithstanding the
aforementioned hurdles it has faced. Democratic continuity has thus legitimized the
economic exploitation of goods by ethnic groups, instigating in perpetuity an unsteady
democratic foundation.
A significant democratic impediment took place within the island nation during
the late-1980s and a majority of the 1990s.
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underwent a violent civil war with inhabitants of the island of Bougainville calling for
secession from the state.

The Bougainvillean natives who championed secession

polarized to two groups which composed the broad base of support for the attempted
secession (Banks 2008). These two groups consisted of those wishing to close the
Panguna mine – a crucial component of PNG’s exports – due to what inhabitants saw as
inequitable distribution of benefits from the resources they claimed to control ownership
of; and excessive waste from the mine crippling agricultural and hunting practices of
natives (Banks 2008).

While the other faction declared their ethnicity and social

background were closer to those inhabitants of the Solomon Islands; therefore wishing to
secede from PNG to unite with those they are already geographically related to: the
Solomon Islands (Banks 2008). The associate group to the “Panguna group,” a faction
claiming to be an ethnic group distinct and established from the rest of Papua New
Guinea, championed full secession from Papua New Guinea based on the perceived
linear history with the Solomon Islands (Banks 2008).

These asymmetric,

autochthonous, and economic claims by the Bougainvillean belligerents forced Papua
New Guinea into a civil war lasting nearly a decade (Koczberski and Curry 2004). Clear
asymmetric claims by autochthonous groups cause an indisputable chance for democratic
backslide due to the potential instability caused by groups acting unilaterally on
entitlement claims. Disputes concerning the natural resources on the island coupled with
claims by Bougainvilleans who believed they were of completely different ethnic
backgrounds from other PNG inhabitants lead to the explosive result of civil war
(Hawksley 2006, Banks 2008).

The associated actors may not have been seeking

exclusively financial retribution from the government, however, the asymmetric claims
37	
  

	
  
for secession with an emphatic call for an equitable economic restructuring brought
violence to PNG.

Economics and ethnic differences were brought to a violent

culmination in Bougainville. The fusion of multiple claims caused an overall instigation
of instability on the already fragile democratic structure of the state.
The onset of civil war and the closing of a crucial mine PNG was dependent upon
– which accounted for a large portion of the country’s GDP (Hawksley 2006) – brought
near-disastrous economic and social conditions to the fragile state. Due to attacks on the
mine’s infrastructure by Bougainvillean combatants – destroying necessary utilities, such
as electricity – Panguna mine was subsequently closed; this detrimental loss constituted
approximately 19% of PNG’s gross domestic product, 24% of government revenue and
36% of export earnings (Hawksley 2006). This coalesced into even greater problems for
the PNG government with repercussions felt throughout the state. The Bougainville
conflict rendered new doubts by the international community – foreign governments and
economic institutions – that, despite the increasing prices of commodities (a main source
of revenue for PNG), the PNG government would be unable to quell the crisis, thus
leading to the state’s inability to function in a democratic capacity while also rectifying
its economic obligations (Hawksley 2006, Matthew 2000). Therefore, the combatants of
the Bougainville conflict caused considerable damage not just to the state of PNG, but
also PNG nationals dependent on state services kept afloat by profits from the mine due
to the overall loss in revenue. Bougainvillean combatants seeking greater recognition,
greater autonomy, and greater economic redistribution brought Papua New Guinea to its
knees for nearly a decade. The laissez-faire approach to peacekeeping and intervention,
which PNG insisted upon, by interested states such as New Zealand and Australia, may
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have procured a longer conflict (Rolfe 2001).

The noninterventionist approach of

peacekeeping saw a nearly decade long battle ultimately come to a close in January of
1998, which culminated in Bougainville becoming an autonomous region of PNG;
acquiescence by both parties to enter into a beneficial resolution produced an end to a
violent civil war which cost the PNG government heavily and cost thousands their lives
(Rolfe 2001, Hawksley 2006). Had the Papua New Guinea government heeded the initial
violence within Bougainville by autochthonous claimants, a quicker resolution may have
been possible.

However, due to the complexities of ethnic heterogeneity, this was

perhaps unfeasible.
Papua New Guinea, like a preponderance of developing countries, has seen its fair
share of violence and corruption within its borders, which has abetted in the stunted
development of a stable democratic state. The Bougainville conflict brought an increase
in banditry throughout island and the state resulting in a loss of confidence by foreign
investors Papua New Guinea to police its own state and protect the investments being
made (Hawksley 2006). Moreover, “the apparent inability of the PNG government to
curb violence and improve the law and order situation has led to a considerable loss of
confidence on the part of the national and international business community” (Booth
1995). Security shortfalls precipitate an overall devaluation of confidence in PNG’s
ability to deliver on economic and societal goods, thus causing a ripple effect which will
be detrimental to the nation as a whole.

Corruption of governmental figures only

provokes fears of turbulence. In addition to security issues, problems with abuses of
power and political interference have occurred at all levels of government within PNG,
from members of parliament to the civil service to the executive (Anare 2012).
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Corruption and violence only perpetuate any derogatory issues facing PNG, such as
economic inequality. Not addressing the ineptitudes of the state will only seek to cause
further destabilization to an already volatile democratic structure.
The PNG government, despite rapid turnover throughout the years has exhibited a
predilection for continuity. However, this has changed slightly in recent years. Most
government turnovers in PNG have been accomplished through constitutional means
(May 2013). Due to a coup in 2011 which saw the installation of a new prime minister
by the country’s unicameral parliament, the comparatively stable democratic process in
PNG witnessed an abrupt departure from democratic means (May 2013). This brief lapse
in democratic permanence is perhaps a one-time occurrence, however, it does mar the
reputation of stability PNG has come to exemplify. The majority of PNG’s postcolonial
existence has exhibited a country that is free or partly free, showing tendencies for brief
democratic regression.4 Despite the numerous factors impeding PNG’s democratic and
economic growth, we see continuity of a meager democratic system, hinging between a
liberal democracy and illiberal democracy.

Utilizing the strict characteristics of a

democracy (Coppedge and Reinicke 1990, Linz and Stepan 1997, Zakaria 1997,
Carothers 2002, Coppedge et al. 2011, Coppedge 2012), PNG rests somewhere in a gray
area, between a liberal and illiberal democracy. Redistribution and constant electoral
turnover issues facing PNG is cause for concern. The abrupt flight from democratic
procedures due the 2011 coup exhibits a brief slide from democratic standards. This
slight departure could be an indication of things to come. The moments which saw a
reduction in democratic efficacy signified a departure, be it minimal, from democratic
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practices. The entire system has become highly fragmented and representative of a
democracy in decline – the fractured party system, low voter turnout, high turnover of
candidates, weak and unstable executive government, the failure of local governments,
inter-ethnic conflict, all the while protracted competition between clans to squander
resources continues (Reilly 2001: 61, 2008). Intense economic competition between
clans will create a greater economic inequity, decreasing the likelihood for redistribution,
and potentially spurring violence, thus presenting indicators which will categorize PNG
beneath the democratic threshold.
The predictors utilized thus far by academics to determine potential democratic
backslide are not applicable to all states. This is evident in the case of Papua New
Guinea.

The indicators previously discussed at length as potential foundations for

democratic backslide prove to be scattered, providing overall inconclusive results in some
cases. Therefore, to attribute democratic regression to a certain predictor would be
premature, proving at times democratic backslide can be unpredictable. A state can defy
the predictors established by academics.

The predictors predominantly utilized to

quanitfy backslide require greater examination to impede such easy application, resulting
in weak assumptions. The economic factors present in the PNG case, such as economic
inequality, have shown to be viable predictors for democratic backslide (Lipset 1959,
Przeworski, et al. 1996: 49, Boix 2003: 5, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006: 43, 191-193),
are not wholly feasible predictors within this case. Moreover, where GDP ought to
contribute to deeper democratic regression (Lipset 1953) it appears to be ineffectual in
PNG’s decline. An important aspect of PNG is the soaring ethnic heterogeneity, a
characteristic which can lead to autochthonous claims, such as those asserted by the
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Bougainvillean factions (Koczberski and Curry 2004). Clearly illustrating the drastic
spiral which can take place by allowing such policy claims to move forward. Thusly,
asymmetric claims can easily cause a democratic vacuum if not addressed in a timely and
over-inclusive approach. Papua New Guinea is a case which has exhibited democratic
continuity, while congruently exhibiting qualities of an illiberal democratic state when
examined under austere definitions.
Papua New Guinea is a case which will need to be continually examined to
determine whether it has met, or fallen short of, democratic standards. The literature thus
far has provided a spectrum of results, which can position PNG in a number of
democratic statuses. However, this thesis’ determination presents the case of Papua New
Guinea as a state going against the grain, while also revealing a state succumbing to the
multifaceted predictors of democratic backslide, such as state newness and ethnic
heterogeneity. Papua New Guinea is an enigmatic case which will continue to face
challenges as evidenced by the poor economic conditions, ethnic fractionalization, and
volatile government (local and federal). However, how these conditions will ultimately
affect the state in the long run has yet to be seen. The backslide characteristics PNG
exhibits places Papua New Guinea as a state in a decline. We have been provided with a
glimpse of what may be to come should instability continue, and certain detrimental
factors – ethnic fractionalization, low GDP, party divisions, violence, corruption – not be
addressed properly . At the present time, Papua New Guinea falls in line with neither a
liberal democracy nor illiberal, but rather somewhere in between.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUDING REMARKS
New Approaches with New Results
As the third wave of democratization began to manifest itself, when authoritarian
regimes began to collapse, a time of democratic transition flourished (Huntington 1991:
14-15). States began to overpower long held authoritarian powers, ushering in a new
generation of democratic hopefulness. Each postcolonial state of the third wave faced its
own difficulties. The malfunctions of each state are unique to itself; there will never be
two identical states with identical problems. As such, each nation must be examined and
dealt with on a case-by-case basis, as states are not identical, and democratic transitions
are not always predictable (Carothers 2002, Ottaway 2002). To categorically place all
developing states together is implausible and negligent as no two states are the same.
Therefore, no two states will regress from a democratic structure in the same manner.
The theoretical arguments exhibited here demonstrate a lack of consensus as to
the rationale for democratic backslide. As I have argued above, there is not a single
predictor of democratic backslides, but rather an assemblage of multiple characteristics.
Two leading predictors of democratic backslide are ethnic heterogeneity (Rueschemeyer,
et al. 1992: 49, Horowitz 1993, Collier 2007: 49-50, Alemán and Yang 2011, Casey and
Owen 2014) and democratic “newness” (Blimes 2006). Younger, newly formed states
when exhibiting moderate levels of ethnic fractionalization, as presented in the case of
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Papua New Guinea, show a greater likelihood for democratic regression at some point in
their growth. The initial stages of democratic development are delicate steps that need to
be taken with caution and strictly observed. Fully inclusive, power-sharing democratic
systems, such as a parliamentary system, which can exhibit quick electoral turnover,
appear best suited to handle threats of asymmetric claims (Kapstein and Converse 2008,
Linz and Stepan 1996: 141, 181). This is clear in the case of Papua New Guinea which
despite its volatility, economic disparateness, and moments of democratic regression, has
been able to maintain an appearance of continuity.
Ethnic entrepreneurs seeking to exploit transitioning governments will pose the
greatest threats in democratic turnover. Without addressing allegations and veto threats
by those seeking to coerce ethnic divisions only increases the probability of democratic
backslide, as seen during the Bougainville civil war in PNG (Reilly 2008). Acquiescing
to outbidding demands is generally the easiest route to assume, however, accepting
demands centering on accommodation in which extremist forces typically command the
stage ameliorates the chance of digression from democratic standards (Reilly 2000).
Zero-sum challenges brought by ethnic groups adversely affect any democratic and
economic growth (Shoup 2011, 2014), which in combination with the “newness” of a
democratic society (Blimes 2006) will only increase the chances of backslide.
Asymmetric claims by autochthonous groups cannot be ignored, however, they also
cannot be fully acquiesced to. Negotiation and deliberation are requisite in providing
assistance to unstable, developing states with any level of ethnic fractionalization. As I
have exhibited and defended throughout this thesis, democratic backslide is not instigated
by a single factor, yet rather a score of factors. This has been presented and argued in the
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case of Papua New Guinea. The factors present in Papua New Guinea, which would
generally force a state into democratic backslide, have not caused deep democratic
regressions, but regressions nonetheless.

Despite the asymmetric claims of

Bougainvilleans which forced Papua New Guinea into a full-scale civil war, the island
nation has remained in a gray area between a liberal and illiberal democracy. Had the
unilateral claims of the Bougainvilleans not been addressed rationally by the PNG
government, greater violence and economic detriment could have forced the state’s
already strained structure into a full democratic spiral. The asymmetric claims, however,
did force the hand of the PNG government to allow greater autonomy to a territory under
sovereign control (Rolfe 2001, Hawksley 2006). Notwithstanding the asymmetric claims
of the Bougainvillean factions and near collapse of the state coupled with heavy
economic problems plaguing nation, Papua New Guinea has pushed on walking the
border between a liberal and illiberal state (Hawksley 2006). The same cannot be said for
a number of developing states.
Structural, institutional, and cultural factors each pose a certain threat to
democratic stability, however, to place causation on a single factor would be unjustified.
The contributing traits to backslide discussed augment democratic deterioration only to
an extent, yet when intermixed with other factors does democratic regression become
fully apparent, and exponentially probable. Coupling ethnic heterogeneity with other
contributing factors, such as democratic “newness” or weak economic conditions,
provoke instability. Moreover, precarious democratic conditions when merged – such as
the multitude present in PNG (Reilly 2001: 61) – permit instability.

For instance,

allowing ethnic entrepreneurs to exploit the weak government system by asserting veto
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threats and mobilizing ethnic groups in states also exhibiting weak economic conditions
(Koczberski and Curry 2004, Shoup 2011, 2014). States not equipped to handle threats
by majority ethnic factions create a greater probability for backslide. Moreover, fully
inclusive parliamentary states aid in the creation of an equitable atmosphere to assuage
all interested parties by causing a mutual dependence to form a functioning government
(Stepan and Skach 1993). Mutual dependence will force concessions by all interested
parties to form a functioning government thus benefiting the nation as a whole, a quality
seen in Papua New Guinea (Reilly 1999, 2000, 2004).

However this does not

automatically ensure a state remains democratic, as other critical factors, such as ethnic
heterogeneity and democratic “newness,” must be examined and addressed to avoid
regression.
In finality, we as nation-builders and scholars lack pure, definitive indicators
which will provide us with a conclusive path to determining clear causes of democratic
backslide. Moreover, to implement such decisive indicators in a continually evolving
arena would skew the democratic and liberal accomplishments, and regressions, of states.
As I have presented throughout this thesis, we do have certain measures to utilize which
can provide signals as to whether a state is nearing a democratic spiral; or whether the
state will utilize its positive factors to recover, allowing it to continue in perpetuity as a
liberal, democratic state. New examinations of states – utilizing characteristics which are
equally stringent, intensive and comprehensive – will provide advanced, conclusive
results as to whether a state has achieved, or retreated from, liberal and democratic
thresholds.
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